Recently, my wife and I were working in our backyard when we noticed a drone, floating by our yard just below tree-top level. As soon as we stood-up to look at the buzzing drone, it came closer to our position hovering just above our heads out of reach. 

Yes, drones have become ubiquitous. In Texas, they shoot them down like game birds. Cases are now starting to percolate into the common law of Michigan that examine the relationship between evidence obtained from invasive devices like drones, and our privacy. 

The Michigan Court of Appeals recently decided Long Lake Township v Maxon, an interesting case pitting evidence gathered by a drone against a couple's right to privacy on their own property. The Township cited the couple for an ordinance violation; the Township was informed relative to the Maxon's alleged zoning ordinance violation via drone surveillance footage; the drone footage was obtained without a warrant. 

The Maxons have a long history of litigation with Long Lake Township in Grand Traverse County over the Township's nuisance ordinance banning certain forms of salvage and junk operations. A settlement agreement had been governing relations between the parties since 2008, and prevented the Township from filing a violation against the homeowners. 

In 2018, however, the Township complained that the Maxons had expanded their salvage operation over the past decade. To prove their contention, they hired Zero Gravity Aerial to make photographic drone flights directly over the Maxon's property in the years 2010, 2016, 2017, and 2018. 

Throughout these years, the Township did not secure a warrant for the drone flights. The evidence collected clearly indicated an increase in the number of junked cars on the property. 

Citing their right to be free from government searches without a warrant based on probable cause, the Maxons moved to supress the evidence obtained from the drones. In denying their motion, the trial court judge ruled that the homeowners had no expectation of privacy in their yard based on the "fixed wing" doctrine; therefore, without a privacy interest, a warrant was not required and the evidence gathered from the Township drones could be used to prove their case. 

If a party has a reasonable justifiable expectation of privacy under the circumstances of a particular case, then the government must obtain a search warrant based on probable cause to invade that private sector. If there is no reasonable expectation under the circumstances, then no warrant is required. Within the jurisprudence of probable cause, warrantless searches are  presumptively disfavored by the courts. This case is interesting because it adds a drone surveillance component that was not present in earlier cases.

Michigan has a drone statute which states:

(1) A person shall not knowingly and intentionally operate an unmanned aircraft system to subject an individual to harassment. As used in this subsection, "harassment" means that term as defined in section 411h or 411i of the Michigan penal code, 1931 PA 328, MCL 750.411h and 750.411i.

  (2) A person shall not knowingly and intentionally operate an unmanned aircraft system within a distance that, if the person were to do so personally rather than through remote operation of an unmanned aircraft, would be a violation of a restraining order or other judicial order.

  (3) A person shall not knowingly and intentionally operate an unmanned aircraft system to violate section 539j of the Michigan penal code, 1931 PA 328, MCL 750.539j, or to otherwise capture photographs, video, or audio recordings of an individual in a manner that would invade the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.

  (4) An individual who is required to register as a sex offender under the sex offenders registration act, 1994 PA 295, MCL 28.721 to 28.736, shall not operate an unmanned aircraft system to knowingly and intentionally follow, contact, or capture images of another individual, if the individual's sentence in a criminal case would prohibit the individual from following, contacting, or capturing the image of the other individual.

Long Lake v Maxon is one of the first cases to apply this statute to a proceeding. The Court of Appeals characterized the zoning ordinance proceeding as quasi-criminal given the state powers intersecting with private property. The appellate court conducts a tour de force of case law pertaining to our "expectation of privacy" within the Fourth Amendment search warrant context. Drones are distinguished from aircraft in the case; they are characterized as smaller, quieter and more discreet than fixed-wing manned aircraft.

The United States Supreme Court addressed these issues within the "aircraft" context and has opined that a property owner's reasonable expectation of privacy should not be, "at the mercy of advancing technology." The Court of Appeals agreed, holding:

We conclude that; much like the infrared imaging device discussed in Kyllo; low-altitude, unmanned, specifically-targeted drone surveillance of a private individual’s property is qualitatively different from the kinds of human-operated aircraft overflights permitted by Ciraolo and Riley. We conclude that drone surveillance of this nature intrudes into persons’ reasonable expectations of privacy, so such surveillance implicates the Fourth Amendment and is illegal without a warrant or a traditional exception to the warrant requirement.

 Notably, the published opinion contains a dissent from Judge Karen Fort Hood. She concludes that, since the Township operated the drone flights over the property just like any other drone operator, then the property owners did not have an expectation of privacy. 

Post #629

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An interesting case from the Oakland County Family Court poses the question: is a fertilized yet frozen human embryo property or a person?

Oakland County Family Court Judge Lisa Langton has been assigned the task of deciding this question. One couple on her custody docket cannot agree on the disposition of a group of frozen embryos.

The couple, Gloria Karungi and Ron Ejalu, contracted with an in vitro fertilization clinic whereby 10 of the couple's embryos were frozen from their genetic materials. According to the contract, the frozen embryos are characterized as the joint property of the parties; any disputes between the tissue donors and the clinic are to be settled through arbitration; the contract is silent as to disputes between the donors.

Unfortunately, the parties to the embryo contract have a daughter with sickle cell disease and Mom and Dad are no longer a couple. Mother believes that if she has another child with Father's DNA, using a frozen embryo, genetic material from that child may be able to help or cure her daughter.

Father will not agree with Mother's request to implant one of the embryos to beget a second child. So the matter was brought to the family court where Mother sought a legal ruling on the "custody" of the embryos. 

Judge Langton ruled that she only had jurisdiction over the couple's daughter and limited her decisions in the case to custody, parenting time and child support relative to the daughter. In dismissing the embryo dispute, she based her ruling on a case-code selected by the parties when Mother initially filed the entire matter as a child support case.

Mother appealed Judge Langton's ruling to the Michigan Court of Appeals. In her appellate filings, Mother raised all manner of custody arguments relative to the embryos, claiming that the family court had jurisdiction on the basis that a frozen embryo was a "person".

One indication of the unusual nature of the case is that each of the three appellate judges assigned to the panel wrote a separate opinion. The case was remanded back to Judge Langton in a 2-1 vote.

In the lead opinion, Judge Colleen O'Brien -a former Oakland Circuit Court Judge herself- wrote that the lower court should have treated this case as a contract dispute, not a custody matter. In remanding the case back to the family court, however, the Court of Appeals noted that the record was insufficiently developed to determine whether the family court had jurisdiction.

The appellate court mused whether the subsequent conduct of the parties served to amend the contract; it also wondered whether one or both parties waived the arbitration clause of the contract by their filings in the family court; the court further speculated that the family court, and not the civil division, was the proper court to decide this dispute.

Taking issue with the dissenting opinion, Judge Christopher Murray felt compelled to write a concurrence, emphasizing that the majority opinion properly identified and corrected the family court's error: the lower court improperly dismissed the embryo dispute based on the case caption.

Judge Murray points out that in remanding the matter to further develop the record, the majority opinion merely points out that an issue may exist regarding the family court's primary jurisdiction due to the arbitration clause contained within the embryo contract.

In her dissent, Judge Kathleen Jansen adopts a different approach than the majority, noting that the embryo contract technically was between the biological donors and the clinic, not between each other. Nor is Judge Jansen convinced that the arbitration language binds the former couple regarding the embryo dispute as between themselves. This view, of course, provides a green light to the lower court to conduct further proceedings in order to develop a record from which various custody rulings can emanate.

What Judge Jansen found most disturbing was the majority's characterization of the matter as a contract dispute when neither party raised that issue below but rather, couched all of their filings in terms of a custody dispute. Judge Jansen concluded that, "[t]he trial court ... lacked legal authority to consider the disposition of the embryos in the context of a custody case."

Although the Michigan Supreme Court took a pass on this interesting case, Justice Bridget Mary McCormack wrote separately to opine:

....that the trial court should not avoid the question argued by the parties: whether frozen embryos are persons subject to a custody determination. The answer to that question could prove dispositive regarding whether the contracts resolve this dispute. See Harvey v Harvey, 470 Mich 186, 194 (2004) (stating that “parties cannot stipulate to circumvent the authority of the circuit court in determining the custody of children”). And if the trial court concludes that embryos are not subject to a custody determination, it is still bound to make a determination about the proper legal disposition of those embryos, if not under contract law or child custody law. Under Const 1963, art 6, § 1, it has an obligation to exercise the judicial power to decide the dispute before it. See also MCL 600.605 (circuit courts “have original jurisdiction to hear and determine all civil claims and remedies, except where exclusive jurisdiction is given in the constitution or by statute to some other court or where the circuit courts are denied jurisdiction by the constitution or statutes of this state”). 

With the case now remanded to her trial court, Judge Langton will re-consider Mother's motion for summary disposition tomorrow morning. She will decide whether a frozen embryo is a spec of property or a human life.

Post #617
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Wow, Planet Fitness really is the "no judgment zone".

In the early winter of 2015, in Midland, MI, two Planet Fitness customers wandered into the women's locker room. One was a woman; the other, a transgender individual -in this case, a man who identified as a woman.

The woman caught on to the fact that a man, albeit one that identified as a woman, was in her presence in the locker room. Neither party was in a state of undress, and no specific sexual or lewd conduct occurred.

She reported the individual to the store manager, claiming violation of her privacy. When Planet Fitness advised the woman of their policy to accommodate transgender customers, she became vocal about the situation, warning other female customers on several occasions.

Her membership was terminated by the corporation.

Eventually, she contacted a lawyer and filed a civil rights lawsuit under Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. The complaint alleged that the woman was subjected to sexual harassment by operation of the corporate policy allowing customers access to the locker room of their self-identified gender. She also claimed an invasion of privacy and a retaliatory membership termination.

The Midland County Circuit Court granted the company's motion for summary disposition, dismissing the case. The customer appealed and last week, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court decision to dismiss the case.

Holding that mere "opportunity" to be subjected to conduct of a sexual nature does not trigger the civil rights act, the Michigan Court of Appeals required a showing that the plaintiff actually experienced any conduct of a sexual nature. The Court held that the civil rights act requires that the sexual conduct substantially interferes with utilization of a public accommodation, such as the female locker room at your local Planet Fitness.

For his part, the lawyer for Plaintiff commented to Michigan Lawyers Weekly that the Court of Appeals got it wrong. According to Plaintiff, the mere presence of a man in the women's locker room creates a hostile environment under the civil rights act. When that situation is expressly endorsed by the establishment -the public accommodation- through its policy, then counsel believed his case should have survived summary disposition.

Over here at the Law Blogger, this case has given us something to think about. Perhaps the offended female customer will take the matter to the next level: the Michigan Supreme Court.

Post#597
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On Saturday, the Michigan Supreme Court issued an order granting leave for an appellant that had been plea-convicted of sexually assaulting a 12-year old victim back in 1994. Twenty years later, in 2014, the Wayne County Circuit Court granted defendant's motion to be removed from Michigan's sex offender registry.

The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the Wayne Circuit Court, reinstating the CSC-II convict's lifetime registration requirement. At the time of his conviction for groping and fondling the breasts of a then-12-year old girl, the defendant was 19-years old and thus, eligible for Holmes Youthful Trainee status.

This particular defendant successfully completed a 3-year probationary term and his conviction was dismissed back in 1997. His registration requirements under the sex offender registration act [SORA], however, lived on and follow him to this day.

No one is going to shed a tear for any convicted felon that took advantage of a young girl. Nevertheless, the Michigan Supreme Court, in its order granting leave to appeal, instructed the appellate lawyers to brief the following long list of issues:

• Whether placement on the SORA amounts to "punishment"; 
• Does it matter whether the plea-convicted felon attained trainee status; 
• Whether the SORA registration requirement violates a trainee's constitutional due process when a conviction is removed based on successful completion of probation; 
• Whether application of the civil regulatory scheme contained in the SORA violates the due process of a trainee, even if the SORA requirements are not considered "punishment";
• Whether the requirements of SORA that were instituted after defendant's conviction amount to ex-post-facto punishment and are therefore unconstitutional; and finally,
• Whether lifetime SORA registration constitutes "cruel and unusual" punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Unites States Constitution.

With that many questions directed to be briefed, the ultimate opinion in this case will be an outright referendum on the constitutionality of the SORA. Such a referendum has been a long time in the making; the Michigan Supreme Court was patient in order to select its case wisely.

We will watch and monitor this case. Oral argument will occur yet this term, after the briefs have been filed; an opinion likely will be issued sometime in June, just prior to the conclusion of the High Court's term.

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Post #513

On Wednesday, I had an unusual professional experience: oral argument before the Michigan Supreme Court; a first in my 28-years of practice. The case, People v Robertson, was a simple one involving the "search and seizure" clause of the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Seven justices sit on our state's High Court. So when you appear before the Court, any one of those 7 justices can and do interrupt your argument to pose questions; questions to which you better have a good answer.

In nearly three decades of practicing law, both at a large Detroit law firm, and now a small firm in Clarkston, I have presented over 100 oral arguments to the Michigan Court of Appeals. When you appear at the Michigan Court of Appeals, you face a 3-judge panel.

Back at the turn of the Century the 280,000 square foot Michigan Hall of Justice was built using 14,000 limestone panels. The post-modern edifice, designed by Albert Khan Associates, houses both the Michigan Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, judicial offices and chambers, and some very impressive administrative offices.

It was a great experience to appear before our High Court. We now have to await the opinion [could be a month or two] to see whether our client prevailed, or whether the the Oakland County Prosecutor was successful in overturning Oakland County Circuit Judge Martha Anderson's decision to exclude damaging evidence in this drug possession and delivery case.

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Post #511

Judge Colleen O'Brien

This afternoon, long-serving Oakland County Circuit Judge Colleen O'Brien was appointed by Governor Rick Snyder to the Michigan Court of Appeals. Tomorrow, the Governor has a scheduled news conference to announce his appointment to fill the vacancy on the Michigan Supreme Court created by Justice Mary Beth Kelly's surprise resignation in August.

Judge O'Brien has run for a seat on the Michigan Supreme Court in past elections and has been a persistent name mentioned whenever the discussion arises about appointments to the intermediate appellate court. She will be sorely missed by those of us who practiced before her in the Oakland County Circuit Court. A true "judge's judge", O'Brien is currently serving as the President of the Michigan Judges Association

Vacating her spot on the bench now leaves two seats open on the Oakland County Circuit Court that need to be filled soon. Judge Rudy Nichols retired over the summer and his seat has been filled temporarily by a visiting [retired] judge.

One rumor that proved true is that Oakland Family Court Judge Cheryl Matthews will move from the family court to the court of general jurisdiction. The family court is where new judges are usually assigned upon their election or appointment to the circuit court.

Judge Mathews follows former family court judges James Alexander and Martha Anderson to the general civil court. Could Judge Lisa Gorcyca be far behind?

Governor Snyder therefore now has his work cut out for him in filling these seats. Political influence will be spent in the upcoming weeks; the State Bar of Michigan will compile a list; and many a district court judge will angle for a promotion.

Some of the names we've heard over here at the Law Blogger we liked; other judicial hopefuls we're not so sure would make good judges. But we've come to accept that experienced litigators -lawyers that actually see the inside of a courtroom- are usually never considered for judicial appointments and rarely run for judge on the non-partisan ballot; go figure.

One lawyer that fits the non-litigator description on the Governor's short list for the Supreme Court is University of Michigan Law Professor Joan Larsen. Professor Larsen graduated from Northwestern University Law School and has recently served as a special counsel to the UM Law School Dean. If Professor Larsen is appointed to the High Court, she will be going from one ivory tower to another.

These recent events, and the Governor's imminent appointments to the Oakland Circuit Court, will have an important impact on Oakland County residents planning to file for divorce in the upcoming months. If you are involved in proceedings before the Oakland County Circuit Court, consider hiring lawyers that have experience in this town.

Our lawyers have seen judges in this town come, and we've seen judges go. We're still here; open for business at 8:00 tomorrow morning.

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Tasers and stun guns are not just for law enforcement anymore. At least so says the Michigan Court of Appeals in a Taser case that arose out of Bay County Circuit Court.

Several years ago, our law firm represented a woman on appeal that was convicted of possession of a Taser. She would shoplift from retail stores and then, when she was ultimately chased-down and confronted by the loss prevention staff, or the unsuspecting employees of the store, she would fire-off her Taser.

Her convictions for retail fraud and assault were affirmed. But we're not so sure that her conviction for possession of a Taser would stand today.

That's because three years ago, the Michigan Court of Appeals decided People v Yanna, which invalidated our state statute making possession of a Taser or stun gun illegal. The Court of Appeals panel held that the statute was an unconstitutional violation of our right to carry and bear arms.

Fast forward three years, and we have the age-old concerns of gun control bumping-up against the constitutional right to bear arms. The conflict has played out in the national media with shooting massacres that erupt seemingly every month, and with police conduct under more scrutiny than ever before.

The Yanna panel had no problem defining a Taser or stun gun as an arm under the 18th Century definition of that term. The scope of the definition includes, "any weapon of offense or armor of defense." There is certainly no reason why a weapon of non-lethal force should not be included within that definition.

For its part, the Bay County Prosecutor asserted that Tasers were ill-suited for lawful defensive purposes; that they can be used to torture someone or to incapacitate an unsuspecting individual [like the loss prevention staff in our case]. When it comes to the Second Amendment and its Michigan constitutional counterpart, such an argument is unavailing and unpersuasive.

As the Court of Appeals noted, any weapon can be used to torture and maim; this is the nature, essence and potential of the thing. While we here at the Law Blogger do not have a problem with the inalienable right to bear arms bestowed upon each of us through the Second Amendment, we do look askance at how our fellow citizens are abusing this right by procuring guns for the sole purpose to kill innocent people.

The Second Amendment contains a very large assumption that weapons will be wielded purposefully and with just and proper cause. In today's world, as we see every day, that's a huge leap of faith.

We're beginning to think that it may be an intractable problem destined to be a prominent feature of America's legacy.

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Last week, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the felony marijuana manufacturing conviction of a Tuscola County man based on how the 68 pot plants seized from his warehouse were weighed by the Sheriff. The defendant in the case had a valid medical marijuana card.

The Sheriff deputy testified probable cause was obtained based on the pot smell coming off the building and from the numerous pot plants that were visible by looking into the windows of the warehouse.  All the plants were seized and Johnny Randall was charged with manufacturing marijuana, a felony.

In his defense, Randall moved to dismiss the charges under the immunity section of the Medical Marijuana Act; he asserted that he was a care provider for 5 individuals [the maximum under the Act] and was a certified "patient" himself.  The trial judge wasn't having it at Randall's bench trial, denied the motion to dismiss, convicted the defendant, and sentenced him to 180-days jail, held in abeyance pending an appeal.

This is not just another pot case on appeal.  This case featured a detailed analysis of how pot plants are counted and weighed within the context of the criminal manufacture statute and the Medical Marijuana Act.

Randall's was a full-on hydroponic marijuana manufacturing operation which included dozens of plants in various stages of the process. This included drying plants and others in the mid-growth cycle.

At his bench trial, the deputy sheriff testified that some of the seized plants were dried; other plants were still maturing.  The sheriff pulled out the live plants and left them out to dry before sealing them up in an evidence bag to be used in Randall's trial.

The Court of Appeals held that only the dried marijuana leaves are to be considered the "usable" portion of the plant and thus, still growing plants and the "incidental" seeds, stalks, and unusable roots cannot be counted against the caregiver-patient.

Under this interpretation of the Medical Marijuana Act, Randall was well-below his 15-ounce weight limit as a caregiver for himself and 5 other individuals. His conviction was therefore dismissed and his sentence was vacated.

These and other aspects of the immunity provision contained in the Medical Marijuana Act were recently argued before the Michigan Supreme Court in three consolidated cases from Oakland County; a decision is expected later this spring.

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If you have ever filed a law suit, then you know the importance of getting each of the defendants named in the suit properly served.  When this does not happen in accord with the applicable court rules, your case can be dismissed.

Last month, two interesting cases played out involving process servers: one in federal court and one in the Michigan Court of Appeals.  Both cases present a rare peek into the tense world of service of process.

The first case, Putruss v Kastaw, was filed in the Oakland County Circuit Court and assigned to Judge Rae Lee Chabot.  The case arose from a melee that occurred at Plaintiff's Southfield clothing store, MODA Couture, when some customers became unruly, allegedly causing damage to the store.

Some of the customers involved were charged criminally, but were subsequently acquitted by jury.  The store owner sued in civil court for damages.  There were discussions between the criminal defense lawyer and the lawyer for the clothing store concerning whether the criminal defense lawyer would accept service of the complaint in the civil matter on behalf of the defendants.

When the criminal defense lawyer declined to represent these individuals and accept service on their behalf, the plaintiff attempted service through deployment of a pair of well-known process servers [one of whom is utilized by our law firm from time to time].  Because the process servers were unable to obtain personal service over the individuals, plaintiffs were granted alternate service, resulting in a dispute over the claimed attempts made by the process servers.

Judge Chabot granted defendant's motion to dismiss stating simply that she was convinced that there was lying under oath by plaintiff's process servers.  Not good enough, said the Court of Appeals in remanding the case for further factual findings by the lower court.

The second case, Nealy v Lotych, pending in federal court in Detroit, involves the allegedly unconstitutional actions of a court officer hired to execute a civil judgment.  The court officer arrived at the judgment debtor's home to execute the judgment, muscled his way in to the debtor's home, would not leave the home, and demanded over $3000 from the debtor and his wife, or he threatened to seize the debtor's truck.

As alleged, the actions taken by the court officer could be deemed illegal and overreaching.  So the federal judge denied defendants' motion for summary judgment.

These cases were covered in an article published in the Michigan Lawyers Weekly.  In the article, Jeff Kirkpatrick, a past president of the Michigan Court Officer Deputy Sheriff and Process Servers Association, stated that while the vast majority of process servers and court officers follow the law, a few "bad apples" sometimes utilize overreaching tactics.

In the near future, it will become an industry standard for court officers and process servers to utilize GPS tracking records to verify their movements relative to an attempted service.  Nothing wrong with a little technological verification when it comes to something as important as achieving personal service.

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Davontae Sanford in better times.

This blog ran a post detailing the plight of young Davontae Sanford back in 2012.  At age 17, Sanford was sentenced, based on his confession, to 37-90 years on 4-counts of second-degree murder for the 2009 Runyon Street shootings in Detroit.

It is widely accepted that his was a false confession and that the real murderer was Detroit hit-man Vincent Smothers, who also confessed to the same crimes; he has repeatedly stated Davontae had nothing to do with the quadruple-murders.

The consequence of Sanford's [false] confession to the Runyon murders was that the DPD ignored the hit man's detailed confession to the same dirty deeds.  They had their man on the Runyon murders [Sanford], and "that-was-that."

According to Sanford's trial transcript, Wayne Circuit Judge Brian Sullivan pushed both sides to produce a plea agreement.  Sanford's plea to second degree murder, in hindsight, may have been rational given Judge Sullivan's comments at his sentencing hearing that, had he not pled, Sanford would have been convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to "the bullet", i.e. life in prison, no parole.

The young man's appeal was decided in his favor last year when the Michigan Court of Appeals remanded his case back to the Wayne County Circuit Court, vacating the lower court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and instructing the lower court to consider expert witness testimony relative to false confessions.  The Court of Appeals also ruled that the hit man, Smothers, could testify at Sanford's remand hearing.

Well, now the Michigan Supreme Court has gone and reinstated the lower court order denying Sanford's request to withdraw his guilty plea.  The High Court held out one last thin straw of hope to Sanford: its order does not prejudice Davontae's right to file what in our industry is known as a 6.500 moition; the last chance "hail Mary" for a convicted felon.

So now it's on to the 6.500 motion; perhaps the judge presiding over the matter in the Frank Murphy Hall of Justice will decide to hear from the experts on the topic of false confessions; perhaps the judge will want to hear from the Detroit Hit Man about these murders.

Either way, Davontae has wasted away in the MDOC for the past five-years for a crime most believe he did not commit.  We here at the Law Blogger need to believe that, despite his false confession, his is a soul worth saving...

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By: Timothy P. Flynn

Sometimes, in the post-judgment phase of a divorcee's life, things can go haywire.  The divorce process can push good parents "off-the-grid".

There is a statute in Michigan that provides for the termination of a divorcee's parental rights if that parent neglects to pay child support and fails to communicate with the children for two years.  For this to occur, the other parent must re-marry and the new spouse must petition for the termination of parental rights as part of a step-parent adoption proceeding.

In a case just recently accepted for briefing and argument by the Michigan Supreme Court, the concept of legal custody within the context of the step-parent adoption statute will be decided.  It could come down to the High Court's interpretation of how the legislature used the words, "a" and "the".

The Kent County case, In Re: ARJ, takes a look at whether the re-married parent must have sole legal custody in order for the step-parent adoption petition to be granted.  The case is significant to the extent that it will interpret this important statute as well as possibly provide additional meaning to the phrase "legal custody"; a phrase over which many a battle have been fought in the family courts throughout Michigan over the decades.

The Kent County Family Court terminated the father's rights after a two day trial.  This termination was reversed by the Michigan Court of Appeals which basically held that the parental termination was done in error because both parents had joint legal custody.

So here we have a parent that has basically disappeared for the requisite two years  -no support, no contact-  but who clings to his parental rights through the label in the judgment of divorce awarding him joint legal custody.

In its order granting leave to appeal the Court of Appeals' decision, the Supreme Court specifically identified one of the issues to be briefed, argued and decided as:

Whether the phrase 'legal custody' in [the step-parent adoption statute] is synonymous with the concept of joint custody in the Child Custody Act, whereby 'the parents share decision-making authority as to the important decisions affecting the welfare of the child...

Our High Court also expressly invited the State Bar of Michigan's Family Law Section and the Michigan Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers to file amicus curiae briefs in the case.

Stay tuned to see how the Michigan Supreme Court interprets this crucial phrase; we will track the case for you.  The decision will likely have important implications for divorce proceedings that involve the custody of minor children.

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By: Timothy P. Flynn

Earlier this year, I was arguing a medical marijuana case before the Michigan Court of Appeals.  My case was probably about the 100th time a panel of our intermediate court of appeals had to address some facet of the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act over the past 5-years.

I could tell from the panel, which included Judge Christopher Murray, that the novelty of the MMA was wearing thin on the judges.  "Oh boy, here we go again; not another medical marijuana case."

Now, these cases are percolating up to the Michigan Supreme Court, which will be hearing arguments tomorrow on yet another medical marijuana case; this one with an interesting twist.  The case, Ter Beek v City of Wyoming, involves the legal challenge brought by a card-carrying pot smoker against his hometown for an ordinance that was passed in response to the MMA.

The challenged Wyoming ordinance subjects people to a violation for possessing marijuana on the basis of the federal prohibition of marijuana as a Schedule I drug, as set forth in the federal Controlled Substance Act. John Ter Beek, a qualified medical marijuana patient, challenged this ordinance in his law suit which seeks a declaratory judgment that the ordinance is invalid because it directly conflicts with state law: i.e. the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act.

The Court of Appeals struck down the Wyoming ordinance on the grounds the ordinance is preempted -swallowed whole- by the medical marijuana act.  In addressing the potential federal preemption of the Controlled Substance Act, the appellate court noted that Congress has traditionally left matters of public health and drug regulation to the police powers of the states.

Tomorrow's oral arguments before the Michigan Supreme Court should prove to be very interesting.  We here at the Law Blogger, having predicted back in 2009 that the MMA would be a great ride, will monitor this case and will post the MSC opinion as soon as it is made available sometime next spring.

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52-4 District Judge
Kirsten Hartig

By: Timothy P. Flynn

This ruling is going to get some attention in high places.  Troy District Judge Kirsten Nielsen Hartig has ruled that Michigan's motor vehicle code provision criminalizing the operation of a motor vehicle with the presence of a controlled substance [marijuana] violates the equal protection clause of the Michigan and United States Constitutions.

The case, People v Sulaka, arose in 2010 when the accused was allegedly speeding and, when pulled-over, could not produce a drivers license.  In the process of making an arrest for this seemingly innocuous violation, the Troy Police officer detected the odor of marijuana coming from the car and took Sulaka to the hospital for a blood draw which yielded a trace amount of THC.

Our friend, Superlawyer Neil Rockind, argued that the controlled substance provision of the motor vehicle code improperly created a strict liability crime, improperly shifted the burden of proof from the prosecutor to the accused, and unconstitutionally created two classes of people treated differently under the law.

Judge Hartig was persuaded to invalidate the motor vehicle code on equal protection grounds.  Here's how the idea works: there are two classes of people subjected to the controlled substance provision of our motor vehicle code.  One group of drivers have medical marijuana cards and are permitted to have THC in their blood stream while driving, so long as the level does not impair their ability to drive [so says the Michigan Supreme Court in a recent case dealing with the medical marijuana act].  The other group of drivers has no such pot card and are strictly liable for operating a vehicle with any amount of THC in their blood.

In her ruling, Judge Hartig relied on a case from the Georgia Supreme Court that held that the effects of legally used marijuana [i.e. medical marijuana here in Michigan] are indistinguishable from the effects of illegal marijuana consumption: the driver is still buzzed under either set of circumstances.  Therefore, no rational public safety interest is served by creating these distinct classes of drivers thus, the equal protection clause of our Constitution is offended.

The case has already made one trip to the Oakland County Circuit Court for the prosecutor's appeal of Judge Hartig's initial dismissal of the case.  Oakland Circuit Judge Colleen O'Brien relied on the now-reversed Court of Appeals decision in the People v Koon case, which ruled that even drivers with medical marijuana cards violated the motor vehicle code when driving with THC in their bloodstream.  [The Law Blogger's take on the Koon case is here.]

Of course, the Oakland County Prosecutor has again appealed Judge Hartig's second dismissal so the case seems destined to grind further through the appellate process.  Regardless of how Judge O'Brien rules in the [second] appeal of right, both sides are heavily invested in this case and can be expected to apply for further discretionary appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals.

We shall see whether the Court of Appeals will grant leave in light of our High Court's ruling in the Koon case.  At some point, our legislature needs to address the disconnect between the motor vehicle code and the medical marijuana act.

Unlike alcohol, which utilizes a blood-alcohol threshold for driving, there is no similar scale for drivers who recently smoked marijuana.  As long as there are lawyers like Rockind out there to skillfully protect the rights of the accused, this will continue to be a problem for the courts.  Perhaps its time for the legislature to act on this issue instead of leaving it up to local law enforcement, prosecutors and municipal judges.

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By: Timothy P. Flynn

Does the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act presume that a certified patient can only consume marijuana by smoking herb, or can pot brownies do the trick?  That was the question posed by a case from the Oakland County Circuit Court that went to the Michigan Court of Appeals.

Now, on last week's remand back to the Oakland County trial court, an evidentiary hearing will be conducted in the People v Carruthers case to determine whether the accused was using a "reasonable" amount of marijuana by baking the pot brownies.

Earl Carruthers was charged with illegally manufacturing marijuana when pot brownies and several ounces of "loose" pot were found in his vehicle; he possessed a medical marijuana card and a caregiver certificate at the time of his arrest.  Oakland County Circuit Judge Michael Warren precluded him from submitting evidence to the jury about his status as a card-carrying medical marijuana patient and care provider.  Judge Warren also ruled that the entire weight of the pot brownie mixture [some 55 ounces] could be taken into account relative to the manufacturing charge.

Even though the circuit court allowed Carruthers to appeal the evidentiary rulings prior to his trial, the Defendant elected to plunge into the trial without the ability to present an affirmative defense as to his medical marijuana use; he was jury-convicted. In appealing this conviction, the broad immunity provision and the narrower affirmative defense section of the MMA were once again interpreted by the Michigan Court of Appeals; this time in the "usable marijuana" context.

 Complicating this issue is the fact that the MMA itself defines "usable marijuana" two different ways: first, the Act references the broad definition set forth in the public health code, then proceeds to promulgate its own, much narrower definition of marijuana:

"Usable marihuana" means the dried leaves and flowers of the marihuana plant and any mixture or preparation thereof, but does not include the seeds, stalks, or roots of the plant.

Whether Carruthers could avail himself of the MMA's immunity provisions [case dismissed; no jury trial] hinged on the weight of the edible.  Judge Warren ruled the whole pot brownie had to be weighed; Defendant asserted that only the net weight of the THC, the active ingredient in marijuana, could be taken into account.  Although the prosecutor's expert stated that THC was present in the brownies, it was impossible to conclude how much.

This ruling could make it difficult for a marijuana patient or care provider to produce pot brownies in conformity with the weight limitations of the MMA.  Critics within the defense bar expressed concerns that the Court of Appeals' decision limits ingestion via the lungs, i.e. with smoke.  Patients that have lung conditions and cannot smoke are thus precluded from legally ingesting baked goods laced with marijuana.

The case will be heading to the Michigan Supreme Court for certain.  Our High Court will once again be called upon to "fill-in-the-blanks" of the MMA.

We here at the Law Blogger must say that the ingestion of pot brownies by a legitimate card-carrying patient sure seems to be consistent with the spirit, if not the letter, of the Medical Marijuana Act.  Stay tuned, as we will be following this one...

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Barbara Hernandez

Barbara Hernandez was convicted in 1991 of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison; she was sixteen years old.  The facts adduced at her trial were that she coaxed her victim, a 28-year old auto mechanic, into a vacant crack-house in Pontiac where her boyfriend, or pimp, depending on who you believe, stabbed him 25-times. 

The motive: robbery to obtain funds to fuel said boy friend's raging crack habit. Sympathy rating on scale of one to five; zero.

More than 20-years after her capital conviction, views on the Hernandez case remain polarizing.  For example, in an AP article detailing the murder, the prosecutor that tried Hernandez here in he Oakland County Circuit Court recently reflected on the case she submitted to the jury.

During her years with the Oakland County Prosecutor, Donna Pendergast, now an Assistant Attorney General, tried many high profile murders.  She had this to say about Hernandez:

Contrary to her assertion that she's cowering around the corner under some sort of influence of her boyfriend, quite the contrary. She's right in the mix and the evidence shows that.  At 16 years old, when you're involved with a scheme of that (kind of) deadly ramifications, you know what you're doing.  

On the other hand, one of the now-retired investigators who took a statement from Hernandez soon after the incident, recently claimed that he no longer recalls her saying that she may have held the victim; he told the AP:  "why I testified to that; who knows?"

Although the U.S. Supreme Court recently decided in Miller v Alabama that mandatory juvenile lifer laws violate the 8th Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, critical aspects on the application of this decision were not addressed by the SCOTUS.  For example, recent cases percolating through the appellate courts here in Michigan address whether SCOTUS' Miller decision should be applied retroactively.

In People v Carp, the Michigan Court of Appeals recently held that the SCOTUS' Eighth Amendment ruling did not apply retroactively.  In doing so, Judge Michael J. Talbot conducted a tour de force of juvenile and capital sentencing jurisprudence, mandating lower courts with pending cases to take a juvenile offender's tender years into account; exhorting the legislature to address this perceived gap in our justice system; but nevertheless refusing to retroactively apply Miller on a collateral review.

Of course, Raymond Carp's attorneys have applied for further appellate review to the Michigan Supreme Court.  The briefs are in, with the Michigan Attorney General having just filed a brief in opposition earlier this month; and [update] an op-ed piece in the Detroit News.

Juvenile lifers recently received a big boost by a decision of United States District Court Judge John O'Meara who ruled that the SCOTUS Miller decision was retroactive for the 350 lifers convicted as juveniles and that prisoners so convicted deserved a chance at parole.

Convicts in Barbara Hernandez's position await the outcome of this decision while their lives burn-down like a candle.  Michigan's oldest juvenile lifer is 68; convicted of murder in 1962.

We here at the Law Blogger have to wonder: do murdering teens deserve a second chance in life?

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The case discussed in this note involves marijuana dispensaries.  They're out there folks; maybe not like Santa Monica Blvd, but they're out there.  Take a look at this Directory of Dispensaries.

The Michigan Supreme Court outlawed medical marijuana distribution schemes pot farmers have been using since 2008 to achieve some basic economy of scale and, imagine this, make money from the effort. The Act provides immunities and defenses for legitimate “patients” and “caregivers”, but pecuniary schemes like the one at issue in this casenote are clearly not protected by the MMMA.

Compassionate Apothecary, a medical marijuana dispensary, or “provisioning center”, was the business model that underwent recent scrutiny by the Michigan Supreme Court in People v McQueen. The Court’s decision spells the end of these easy distribution schemes.

The Compassionate Apothecary (CA) was a “pot club”, if you will. Except for their revenue generation, this club was run about as close to the requirements of the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act as possible. Our High Court, however, determined that the scheme did not comply with the Act, largely on pecuniary grounds.

Brandon McQueen was both a registered patient and the primary care giver to three patients. His business partner, Matthew Taylor, cared for two registered qualifying patients. Together, they ran CA, a membership organization with a physical location consisting of lockers for pot storage and transfer. To be a member, you have to verify your status as a “card-carrying” patient or provider.

The High Court’s syllabus best describes how the collective operated:

To be a member of CA, an individual had to be either a registered qualifying patient or a registered primary caregiver. Caregivers could only be members of CA if a qualifying patient with whom he or she was connected through the state’s registration process was also a member. Patients and caregivers who were members of CA could rent lockers from CA. Patients would rent lockers from CA when they had grown more marijuana than they needed to treat their own debilitating medical conditions and wanted to make the excess available to other patients. Caregivers would rent lockers when their patients did not need all the marijuana that they had grown. Patients and caregivers desiring to purchase marijuana from another member’s locker could view the available marijuana strains in CA’s display room. After the patient or caregiver had made a selection, a CA employee would retrieve the marijuana from the appropriate locker, weigh and package the marijuana, and record the purchase. The price of the marijuana would be set by the member who rented the locker, but CA kept a service fee for each transaction.

CA’s recorded pricing and service fees placed them out of compliance with the Act. Thus, it was a no-brainer for the High Court to affirm the intermediate appellate court and outlaw dispensaries.

In Ypsilanti, Third Coast Compassion Club takes issue with the decision. Without disclosing whether Third Coast charges different prices for various pot strains, or fees to facilitate transactions, their spokesperson said, “ultimately, we’re a private club, not a public store…” Well, good luck with that…

While the decision no doubt spells hardship for those in the, er, budding industry, Jim Lynch of the Detroit News observes “Panicked Uncertainty”. Hardly; but dedicated legitimate patients must now go underground or grow their own.

Free Press coverage touched on the legislative history of the Act; the Freep spoke with pot lobbyist Tim Beck of Detroit, a retired health insurance executive who was one of the scriveners of the original proposal put on the 2008 ballot. Beck indicated the words “sale” or “dispensary” were far too dangerous to use in the ballot initiative, so they were deliberately kept out of the text of the initiative.

The distribution concept integrated into the MMMA is one of: “grow your own”.  Professional horticulturists were not contemplated by the initiative and are not found within the scope of the Act.

Michigan Attorney General William Schuette, who joined the Isabella County Prosecutor in filing the complaint for a permanent injunction against Compassionate Apothecary as a public nuisance, said the Supreme Court’s decision clarifies the MMMA as follows:

 The law does not allow retail sales of medical marijuana.
 Sales or transfers are limited to those between caregivers and their five registered patients.
 Sales or transfers between registered patients are barred.
 Caregivers are not protected when selling or transferring marijuana to unregistered patients.

Among the patients and caregivers that commented to the state’s media yesterday, the theme seemed to be, “where am I gonna get my pot now?” Some medical marijuana patients that spoke with the Oakland Press, the Detroit News and Free Press said they were disappointed in the ruling because it will make marijuana more difficult to obtain.

87th District State Rep Mike Callton (R Nashville) introduced a bill last May which he characterizes as follows:

This isn't about restricting anyone's freedom or access to a substance that is now legal for those with a prescription. This is about making sure patients are safe and the product is safe. Since medical marijuana became legal in Michigan, dispensaries are popping up left and right and we need to make sure these places pass the grandma test.

Well, technically, the Act refers to a physician “certification”, not prescription; like the word “sale”, the word “prescription” does not appear in the MMMA.  So, to fill-in this gap, Rep Callton articulates the “grandma test” on his official website:

If you wouldn't feel safe having your grandma go to one of these places to pick up her medical marijuana, as if she went to a pharmacy, then it needs to be cleaned up or closed down.

Bottom line: the Supreme Court’s decision is a rationale application of the MMMA. Legitimate patients can legally obtain and use marijuana. But, growers beware; and take care not to make a profit, least you find yourself on the wrong side of felony charges.

For now anyway, pot farming is a labor of love…

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Modeling their voter initiative on the ordinance that has been on the books in Ann Arbor for the past 35-years, Grand Rapids took a stab at de-criminalizing marijuana use and possession.  "Not so fast ...", said the Kent County Prosecutor, William Forsyth, and the GRPD.

Pot lobbyists were successful in Grand Rapids last November getting a pot de-criminalization initiative passed.  Promulgation of the city ordinance, however, has been complicated and now, litigated.

The Kent County Prosecutor claims that the ordinance cannot interfere with a state law, and has requested an injunction from a Kent County Circuit Judge.  The prosecutor's argument is that Grand Rapids cannot turn a state law into a civil infraction.

The Grand Rapids City Attorney and a lawyer for Decriminalize GR, the local pot lobby, assert that the voters passed a legal charter amendment which should now apply to those present within the city limits; just like the Ann Arbor, MI ordinance.  The Michigan Constitution, the City Attorney's argument goes, provides citizens with the authority to decide such issues by voter initiative.

The ordinance injunction issue is currently pending with Kent County Circuit Judge Paul Sullivan.  Whoever winds-up on the short end of his opinion will no doubt appeal the decision to the Michigan Court of Appeals.

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It is safe to say that healthcare and the availability of benefits are important to all working people in Michigan.  Nothing wreaks havoc on our day-to-day life more than an unexpected illness, especially when we lack the healthcare benefits necessary to secure the proper treatment.  

A recent decision by the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the Michigan Civil Service Commission (MCSC) could expand the eligibility of health care benefits for state employees to their co-residents, if those persons are at least 18 years old, NOT relatives, and have resided within the same household as the state employee for at least 12-months (but not as a renter or tenant).  

This potential coverage expansion applies to employees who do not have an eligible spouse. Thus, the coverage would apply to boyfriends, girlfriends, and/or same sex partners, as long as they meet the criteria for coverage.

The issue arose when the MCSC allowed for the additional healthcare coverage, and the Attorney General sued on the basis of a violation of Equal Protection; the expanded coverage discriminated against married state employees by excluding married employees from being able to cover non-spouses or other blood relatives. The Attorney General suggested that the policy was a way to circumvent Michigan’s “Marriage Amendment,” which prohibits the recognition of any “agreement” other than “the union of one man and one woman in marriage.” 

The Court of Appeals found the Attorney General’s argument unpersuasive and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the case.  The appeals court held that the new policy, “does not in any way prohibit incidentally benefiting such agreements, particularly where it is clear that an employee here could share benefits with a wide variety of other people.”   The Court further explained that the policy does not, “depend on the employee being in a close relationship of any particular kind…beyond a common residence.”

Further, the Court of Appeals determined that the matter deserved a heightened standard of review, and as such, the policy is “rationally related to advance a legitimate state purpose.”  Specifically, the Court held that as the MCSC drafted the eligibility criteria after negotiating with the unions, “it is not the place of the courts to second-guess the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the state action.” Lastly, the appellate court recognized the Civil Service Commission as having “plenary and exclusive authority” in setting eligibility guidelines for state workers, “because they are provided in exchange for services rendered by state employees.”

In sum, if you are an unmarried Civil Service employee, you may be able to provide healthcare benefits for anyone who has been living with you, as long as they have done so for at least 12 continuous months, they are not a tenant or renter, they are not a blood relative, and they are at least 18 years old.

Apparently, our court of intermediate appellate review does not wish to tread upon the authority of the state bureaucracy when it comes to providing health care benefits for its own.  We here at the Law Blogger think perhaps that is as it should be under our separation of powers.

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Jacob Trakhtenberg

Sitting on a parole board must be tough.  When reviewing a convict's petition for parole, the board member has an enormous amount of pressure to "get it right".

One option is to take the easy route by erring on the side of caution and letting the petitioner's sentence "run it's course".  Eventually, if flopped enough times by the parole board, a convicted felon simply gets released from the penitentiary by serving a statutory maximum period of incarceration.

That is what happened to two convicted felons that have been making headlines this month: one local; the other from Upstate New York.  This post takes a look at the circumstances of the cases, addressing the challenges of the parole system presented in each.

First, the Michigan case.  In 2005, Jacob Trakhtenberg, a former Chief Engineer for Chrysler, was charged in Oakland County Circuit Court with 5-counts of criminal sexual conduct.  The charging instrument did not specify dates of the alleged sexual assaults against his minor daughter, 8-years old at the time, and was silent as to the specific nature of alleged sexual contact.

His initial court-appointed lawyer elected to conduct a bench trial before former Oakland Circuit Court Judge Deborah Tyner, who found the accused guilty on 3 of the five charges.  One of the alleged deficiencies of Trakhtenberg's court-appointed defense counsel was that she did not conduct any investigation whatsoever relative to the prosecutor's disclosed witnesses.

Trakhtenberg was in prison during the years in which his appeals have [twice] traveled the gamut of the Michigan appellate courts.

Although his appeals have finally gained some traction thanks to our friend, appellate specialist Robyn Frankel, this relief may have come too late for the convicted felon.

In November, the defendant was placed on parole, having served 2/3 of his maximum 10-year sentence, and being eligible for release under the applicable Michigan statute.  His second appeal, known as a "6500 appeal" after the specific court rule that provides for such a last bite at the procedural apple, was decided in his favor last week in a Michigan Supreme Court opinion that remanded the case to the Oakland County Circuit Court for a new trial.

In a 4-2 decision [Justice Hathaway abstained], our High Court held:

In this case, defense counsel failed to exercise  reasonable professional judgment when deciding to forgo particular investigations relevant to the defense, including her
failure to identify the factual predicate of each of the five charged counts of criminal sexual conduct, her failure to consult with key witnesses, and her failure to sufficiently develop the defense presented at trial.  Accordingly, her representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.  Defendant was unfairly prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance.  The key evidence against defendant was the complainant’s testimony.  Therefore, the reliability of defendant’s convictions was undermined by defense counsel’s failure to introduce impeachment evidence and evidence that corroborated defendant’s testimony that defense counsel was unaware of because she decided to forgo those investigations.  Had the impeachment evidence and the evidence that corroborated defendant’s testimony  been introduced, there was a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different.  [Syllabus, page 2]

The effective assistance challenge to Trakhtenberg's conviction, ultimately successful in this case, is a critical component of an accused's basket of Sixth Amendment rights guaranteeing a fair trial.

No word yet as to whether the Oakland County Prosecutor will go forward with a second trial considering Defendant has already served a maximum sentence.  Since the completion of his first set of appeals, the initial trial judge, Judge Tyner, resigned from the Oakland County Circuit Court bench and was succeeded on the case by Judge Daniel O'Brien.

The tough part of criminal sexual assault convictions is that the Michigan Department of Corrections has a bright-line policy whereby the offender must complete sexual abuse counseling prior to achieving eligibility for parole.  Often, convicted offenders maintain their innocence, adhering to a campaign of total denial.  This renders them ineligible for an early parole.

While the resulting extended prison stay is justified for a properly convicted abuser, it is a tragedy if the person is wrongly convicted as concluded by the Michigan Supreme Court in Trakhtenberg.

Meanwhile, in Webster, NY, the criminal justice system attempts to make sense of how William Spengler should have been handled.  Spengler, a paroled murderer, allegedly killed two first responders to a fire he started as a decoy prior to killing himself on Christmas Eve.

It has now come to light that Spengler was paroled after serving a 17-year prison sentence for murdering his grandmother with a hammer.  Prior to his release from prison, 4 consecutive parole boards denied Spengler parole despite finding him to be well-spoken, well-behaved and intelligent.

After being released from prison, Spengler kept to himself for about a decade, until he apparently solicited the assistance of a young neighbor's daughter to purchase a shotgun and an assault rifle.  We now know that these were the weapons used in Spengler's murder-suicide.

Comparing these two cases brings the difficulty of the parole process into focus.  Once a person has been warehoused in prison for several years, what does the justice system do with them upon release?

What about persons wrongfully convicted [or unconstitutionally convicted] such as Trakhtenberg?  If ultimately acquitted, he may be entitled to millions in civil damages.  Will this potential exposure play into the Oakland County Prosecutor's decision to re-try the former automotive engineer who has already served all the prison time he could serve?

Are hardened killers such as Spengler ever truly rehabilitated?  Apparently, there is always a significant risk in allowing such killers to walk free among us.

This blog does not claim to have the answers to these tough questions.

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