For some time now, members of Michigan's House of Representatives have proposed a sea change to the Child Custody Act. Last week, Representative Jim Runestad [R-White Lake] re-introduced a modified version of his seemingly perennial child custody and parenting bill.

The attempt, this time around, is known as HB 4691 and seeks to change the spirit as well as the label of Michigan's child custody law. Runestad's bill proposes a new title to the act: the shared parenting act.

In the spirit of this truly sea changing proposed legislation, Runestad seeks to introduce a presumption into the custody act: spending equal time with each parent is in the best interests of the child. A parent seeking to overcome this presumption would need to introduce "clear and convincing" evidence that such a parenting arrangement is not in the child's best interest.

Sounds simple and reasonable enough. Yet, whenever this bill gets re-introduced each session, it is usually met with firm resistance from the organized family bar.

The Oakland County Bar Association, for example, has published the following statement in opposition to the predecessor bill to this term's attempt:

Mandatory equal physical custody would make the best interest of the child factors irrelevant and treat all families exactly the same.  It would require that both parents live in the same school district or travel distances for schooling, require the children to move frequently from house to house regardless of the child’s preference and allow any parent, including convicted felons, to demand equal parenting time. Requiring a standard of ‘unfitness’ to be found by ‘clear and convincing evidence’ directly contradicts nearly all other provisions of the Child Custody Act.  This bill again attempts to remedy a perceived problem which, in fact, does not exist.  The current custody statute(s) and subsequent case law clearly permits a court to determine when it is in the best interest of a child that joint custody, or equal parenting time, be ordered.

This bill focuses on the needs of the parent instead of the needs of the children. 

The opponents and proponents of the bill will likely be heard over the next few months while the bill is debated in the state house's judiciary committee. In recent hearings conducted in May, Wayne County Judge Richard Halloran, the current chair of the state bar's family law section, testified in opposition to the bill. Judge Halloran, like many other family court professionals, is concerned about the effect the new law will have on the ability to address the intersection of child custody and domestic violence.

Representative Runestad, however, is now the chair of the Judiciary Committee. Perhaps because of this, many family law professionals have the sense that the proposed legislation has traction this time around and could become the new custody and parenting law of the state at some point during this legislative session.

Details are always devilish. The bill also constructs a wholesale replacement of the 11 statutory custody factors -long-used by judges- with a new set of factors for the family court to consider. These new factors, according to the bill's sponsors, are designed to ensure a child's meaningful relationship with both parents.

Our good friend and appellate lawyer, Scott Bassett, a lawyer's lawyer if there ever was one, openly wonders on the state bar's family law listserve why the legislature would jettison nearly 75-years of appellate court custody jurisprudence that has developed and honed the child custody act. Darn good question if you were to ask us over here at the Law Blogger.

Some of our more jaded colleagues have stated to this blogger that the bill does nothing to eliminate custody battles; it simply changes the look of the battlefield. Also, opponents say, it puts the parent's litigation agenda over the child's genuine needs and interests.

We will monitor the bill's progress and let our readers know what happens next. Meanwhile, we invite you to post your comments on this hot family law topic. 

Post script: meetings scheduled for Thursday, June 15, were postponed yesterday.

Update: 06/21/2017 - Runestad's bill passed the judiciary committee -no surprise there- and proceeds to the plenary house for further discussion after the recess. 

Post #594

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Recently, we came across an interesting editorial in the Detroit News that addresses how family courts approach the issue of custody in a divorce or family court proceeding. The editorial points-out that Wisconsin is one of only two states with a statutory presumption of joint custody.

Michigan's Child Custody Act does not contain this presumption; it does, however, have language stating that joint custody must be considered. For years, however, there has been legislation proposed that would adopt a true joint custody presumption.

The organized family law bar [the Family Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan] has long-opposed the statutory presumption of joint custody. The argument is mostly based on the theory that custody must be decided on a case-by-case basis, and that frequent cases of domestic violence and abuse make the operation of the joint custody presumption too risky.

While the organized family law bar's opposition has never let the above-referenced House Bill 4141 see the light of day, there is always some opposition to the opposition.  But there is no "trend" or rush to a joint custody presumption.

In Wisconsin, the family courts are now bound to follow the "shared parenting" model; in Michigan, it is known as "co-parenting". As we always advise our clients, the custody label [joint, sole, legal, physical] is less important than the court-ordered parenting schedule and, whenever possible, maintaining communication between two parents that are willing to make parenting compromises that are in the best interests of the minor children.

It is true, however, that in some cases, the co-parenting model is simply not possible. Any divorce lawyer worth her salt can tick-off half a dozen recent cases where one parent or both refused to cooperate with any form of co-parenting, adopting a scorched-earth policy instead.

When this happens, the children pay the price; usually for the rest of their lives. So regardless of whether a state has a joint custody presumption, in all cases, without exception, it is the
p-a-r-e-n-t-s that have to get it together.

If you have a parenting or custody issue, contact us for a free consultation to discuss your options.

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We have all heard the term “visitation” before, especially if you have been involved in a child custody dispute or divorce.  The term most often used by family law lawyers and professionals is “parenting time”; referring to the legal right [and obligation] of a parent to spend time with one’s child following a divorce. 

Even grandparents, under limited and specific circumstances, may have a legal right to visit with their grandchildren according to Michigan law.

But what about siblings?  Does a brother or sister have the right to visit their sibling, if for some reason they are no longer living within the same household? 

The short answer is that sibling visitation is not recognized as a legal right in Michigan.   The Child Custody Act does not provide for visitation rights between siblings.  Add adoption into the mix and the result remains the same – but for a more specific reason.  

Earlier this month, the Michigan Court of Appeals grappled with, and attempted to decide

this very issue in Wilson v King; a published thus binding opinion of the intermediate appellate court.

Marquita Wilson, the plaintiff-mother in this case, had three children who were eventually adopted into a new family in 2008 after her parental rights had been terminated.  Ms. Wilson then gave birth to a fourth child; Mac.  

The adoptive parents of Ms. Wilson's three children initially allowed Mac to visit with his siblings.  Sadly, for reasons not stated in the Court of Appeals opinion, the adoptive parents ultimately discontinued these sibling visits.  

Ms. Wilson filed suit on behalf of Mac in Wayne County Family Court.  The family court judge dismissed the claim on the basis that the right to “sibling visitation” does not exist under Michigan Law.  On appeal, Ms. Wilson argued that Michigan law does provide for a cause of action for sibling visitation and that the lower court had erred in dismissing her case.  

The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision – but did not find one way or the other on whether or not Michigan law provides for a cause of action for sibling visitation.  Instead, the Court focused on the fact that Mac’s older siblings had been adopted.  

Adoption legally severs any ties to the prior, natural family, and creates, in its place, a new adoptive family recognized at law.  This means that, legally speaking, Mac’s older siblings (once they had been adopted) were no longer his legal siblings in the eyes of the law.   

The Court of Appeals held that even if a cause of action regarding sibling visitation existed (which the Court made sure to footnote that they offered “no opinion as to the viability of such a claim”) in Mac’s instance the claim must fail as the three adoptive children were no longer his siblings. 

While we recognize the psychological importance of eliminating contact with biological parents in order to facilitate growth in the new adoptive family, this ruling strikes us as similar in spirit to the old paternity act that denied a biological father standing to seek any parenting time with his child whatsoever.

The ruling seems to foster the notion of wiping-out all traces of the adopted child's  biological family.  Many adopted children, as they mature, seek out traces of their biological families.  Some of these children, as they mature into adulthood, obsess over their lost families and seek therapy to deal with the loss.

At base, however, there is really no-way in cases like this to allow sibling visitation, without also focusing on the biological parents.  Our adoption laws currently do not provide for the maintenance of two families; just one: the adoptive family.

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Yesterday, the NBC Today Show featured a segment on family court cases where a parent was mounting a child custody challenge based on obesity.  This past year, I recall hearing much about the subject of childhood obesity, perhaps due to the First Lady's "Let's Move" campaign.

According to a recent report by the Center for Disease Control, childhood obesity affects 17% of our nation's youth; a figure triple what it was just a generation ago.  Now that this is a recognized condition putting on the cloak of yet another national crisis, should family court judges take childhood obesity into account in the custody calculus?

The father featured in the Today Show segment was shown cooking a vegetarian meal for his two preteen children.  He succeeded in his custody ploy to the extent the family court judge modified  custody such that the children stayed at dad's house during the weeks of the school year.

In Michigan, the Child Custody Act sets forth several factors which a family court judge must consider when deciding a custody dispute.  One of these factors is the capacity of a parent to provide food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care.  Arguably, this factor could include how a parent manages a child's diet; particularly if that child is at risk for obesity or is, in fact, obese.


The relative physical health of the parents and the reasonable preference of the child (particularly if older than age 12) could also come into play in a childhood obesity custody case.  A parent's unhealthy lifestyle may factor into the family court judge's calculus.


In come cases, it may strike the judge as unfair to basically penalize a parent for the child's eating habits.  This is a particularly close case where the obesity may be genetic and thus, hereditary.  Also, how far does the family court go?  


The optimal situation, of course, is where both parties co-parent with the child's best interests in mind.  Diet, exercise and lifestyle, however, often do not mesh between divorced parents.


As our nation continues it's struggle against the bulge, the cases of the type featured on the Today Show may pop up with more regularity in the county family courts across the state.  We all want the best for your young children.  Certainly, a good diet is an important component to a good healthy upbringing.

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Do the regularly maintained statistics support the contention that fathers are getting more time with their children in family courts?  To borrow a lyric from the 70’s band, Boston, “it’s more than a feeling”.

 

Divorce records maintained by the Michigan Department of Community Health reflect a trend that family law professionals have observed, and perhaps helped influence; fathers with joint custody and equal parenting time.

While family law attorneys will no doubt acknowledge this trend, hard statistics are difficult to garner.  Custody is still decided on a “case-by-case”, county by county, basis.

The form used by MDCH to collect information about divorces has a field to designate custody of minor children involved in a case.  The person completing the form, usually an attorney, selects from the basic options of joint custody, or designates custody to mother, or father.

Per usual, however, the devil is in the details.  For many practicing family law, the formal custody designation set forth in a judgment of divorce or custody order is merely a label, and a poor one at that.

Joint legal custody is usually a given; an accepted starting point.  Physical custody, however, is a more contentious battlefield.  The phrase “physical custody” does not even appear in the Michigan Child Custody Act; it is a mechanism used by family law attorneys and family court judges to identify a custodial parent.

The more significant provision is the parenting schedule set forth in the judgment.  Not only does that schedule establish how much actual contact the minor children get with each parent, it also determines the child support obligation for each parent.

Purely anecdotal evidence from our recent divorce cases is consistent with the trend that Fathers are awarded joint custody (legal and physical) more often and, roughly, equal parenting time.  One size, however, does not fit all.

An article titled Throwaway Dads, from the Michigan Bar Journal from 10-years ago, decrying a gender bias against fathers, provides an interesting barometer relative to the climate change in Michigan’s county family courts.

There must be good reasons to establish where the children of a divorce will live, and even better reasons to limit them from the home of one of their parents.  Focusing on the parenting schedule rather than the custody label is the real trend at work here.

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There has been some buzz among family law practitioners this week concerning the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in the DHS vs Beck case.

Earlier this year, we posted on the Michigan Court of Appeals decision that held a father, whose chronic drugging resulted in the complete neglect of his children and termination of his parental rights, nevertheless remained obligated to pay child support for his two children.  The published Court of Appeals decision was just affirmed by the Michigan Supreme Court.

This case arose from the Oakland County Family Court; it was Judge Martha Anderson that initially terminated Mr. Beck's parental rights while also affirming his obligation to pay child support.  Both parents had been abusing drugs so their two children were placed with grandparents.  For her part, the mother  got straight, and otherwise complied with a DHS parenting plan; she now has the children.

The Supreme Court's Beck decision is remarkable in that it is the first decision to be issued by the Court in the current term.  Also, although the decision affirms the holding of the Court of Appeals, it does so on grounds different then those relied on by the intermediate appellate court.

The father in Beck did not appeal the termination of his parental rights; only the family court's ruling that he remained obligated to pay support for his children.  On appeal, the father argued that he was denied due process because he was arbitrarily deprived of his property (i.e. his support payments).  Like the intermediate appellate court, the Supreme Court was not convinced, ruling that the father failed to articulate how, exactly, his due process rights were implicated.

One of the issues to arise in the Beck case was that the parental termination provisions of the Juvenile Code are silent as to the corresponding "parental responsibilities".

The Court analyzed the rights and duties implicated by a family court's decision to terminate parental rights while continuing to obligate support payments.  Michigan common law has long established a minor child's right to support from both parents.  The appellate courts also recognized a parent's right to the "companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children."

In affirming the Court of appeals, the Supreme Court not only separated parental "rights" enumerated in the juvenile code, from the duties set out in the Child Custody Act, it also held that parental rights contained in the Custody Act were distinct and thus independent from the duties created by that same Act.

Of note in the dicta of the Court of Appeal's decision was an express acknowledgment of the current "times of difficult financial circumstances."  The Beck panel realized that in such difficult economic times, public policy is served by not shifting all support and maintenance obligations onto the custodial parent or, in some cases, the state.

This is the right decision.  If getting high is more important to a father than parenting, the rest of us should not have to pick-up the slack for that father and supply public benefits for such a man's children.  He should pay as well, even if he can no longer see his children.

Such are the choices we make in life.

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Last Thursday, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed a custody ruling of the Eaton County Family Court.  The tortured case, Wilbur v Carter, arose from a paternity suit, not a divorce.

The couple in this case conducted a protracted custody battle over their now 11-year old child.  The case features just about every tool available to the family court judge: supervised parenting time; temporary orders; in camera interviews with the child (twice) and evidentiary hearings.

The family court made a series of custody rulings in Father's favor over the years, keeping Mother's custody hopes alive by scheduling review hearings.  Father had been awarded sole legal custody and the stated purpose of the review hearings were to determine whether joint legal custody could be reinstituted.

Although the unpublished decision does not contain the underlying facts, the family court judge apparently did not approve of Mother's life style, removing her as a joint legal custodian of her child, and ordering supervised parenting time with Mother.

Over the past seven years, the parents kept filing motions for custody.  The lower court flip-flopped on the issue, alternating between temporary orders of sole legal custody to Father; then switching back to joint custody.  What troubled the Court of Appeals was that none of the requirements contained in the Child Custody Act were followed.

Before a family court judge changes custody, it must first determine whether an "established custodial environment" exists with either, or both, parents.  This term is defined in the custody act to mean:

if over an appreciable time the child naturally looks to the custodian in that environment for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort. The age of the child, the physical environment, and the inclination of the custodian and the child as to permanency of the relationship shall also be considered.

The Eaton County Family Court neglected to make this determination in the case.  This is important because a court's determination of an established custodial environment determines the burden of proof which the moving parent must satisfy before a change in custody can be made.

In addition, the Court of Appeals was also disturbed because the lower court failed to make any determination that a "change of circumstances" or "just cause" existed to justify the requested custody modification.  Finally, it also reversed the family court because it made no findings of fact based on the 11 statutory custody factors set forth in the custody act.

Often, family courts feel constrained by their crowded dockets and the sometimes "informal" nature of the family court.  Attorneys foster this environment by allowing decisions on custody matters without the requisite findings by the court.

This case stands for the proposition that a family court cannot properly change custody without first: determining whether an established custodial environment exists; then determining whether the requisite "change of circumstances" exists; and finally making a factual determination after an evidentiary hearing as to all 11-factors.

The case calls for good lawyering in each and every custody battle, regardless of the court's resources or the resources of the parties.

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This post summarizes some of the more interesting 2009 family law decisions from the Michigan Court of Appeals dealing with child custody.

In 2009, the Court of Appeals looked at the interplay between the juvenile code and the child custody act in two important cases.  The first case discussed was published and thus binding precedent; the second case is unpublished and does not bind subsequent courts in Michigan.

In a case from Wayne County, In the Matter of A.P., Mother had sole custody of her child from a paternity action.  She was accused of abusing the child.  The resulting juvenile proceedings re-introduced the child’s biological father into the child’s life.  In the lengthily proceedings, the juvenile court’s rulings intersected and conflicted with prior orders from the family court.

The Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court supersedes the family court:

Once a juvenile court assumes jurisdiction over a child and the child becomes a ward of the court under the juvenile code, the juvenile court’s orders supersede all previous orders, including custody orders entered by another court, even if inconsistent or contradictory. In other words, the previous custody orders affecting the minor become dormant, in a metaphoric sense, during the pendency of the juvenile proceedings, but when the juvenile court dismisses its jurisdiction over the child, all those previous custody orders continue to remain in full force and effect. 

 DHS v Gunther is significant as it also addresses jurisdiction via the juvenile code over children that are already under the jurisdiction of the family court.  In this case, Mother had “physical custody” of the parties’ children resulting from a divorce judgment.

The Gunther children came to the attention of DHS due to school truancy allegations resulting in temporary placement of the children with their father.  Mother moved for their immediate return, asserting that the juvenile court referee could not alter the children’s “established custodial environment” without first conducting a hearing, as required by the Child Custody Act.

Again, the Court of Appeals held that once a juvenile court assumes jurisdiction over a minor pursuant to the juvenile code, the juvenile court’s orders supersede all other previous orders; including those issued from a family court.

In Pobanz v Pobanz, the Court of Appeals decided the issue of whether a 17-year old could be court-ordered to participate in parenting time within the context of a custody challenge.  As in the two other cases discussed in this post, Pobanz also featured a co-occurring neglect petition in the juvenile court. 

The trial court stated that it would not force a 17-year to participate in parenting time when she stated that she did not want to see her Father.  Although the Pobanz panel agreed with the trial court that a seventeen year old’s reasonable custody preference is given wide-deference, it held that the lower court erred by not conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the many other statutory factors supported the decision.  The case was sent back to the Huron County Family Court to conduct the hearing.

Surprisingly, the Court of Appeals allowed the trial court to change judges based on the subsequent juvenile case.  The family court judge was first assigned to the Pobanz family in the divorce proceedings, but the trial court transferred the divorce, and Father’s custody motion, to the judge presiding over the subsequent juvenile proceedings.

This ruling is interesting in that it seems to violate the “one family, one judge” concept set forth in 1996 with the creation of the family courts across the state.  According to the reorganization statute, multiple cases involving the same family were all to be assigned to the first judge in the county assigned to that family.

In Bonner v Bonner, the Court of Appeals decided the issue of whether a child could be compelled to testify at hearing on his parents’ competing change of custody motions.  The case featured the open-court testimony of the parties’ minor child, limited to matters of alleged abuse by the Mother.

The case is most interesting for featuring the testimony of a well-respected psychologist that had observed the parties and child at the court hearing(s).  The psychologist then provided testimony to the family court as to his observations of both parents and the child.  Note: The family court judge did not find the child’s testimony about the conditions of his Mother’s home to be credible.

Also, the case is significant in that a child was compelled to testify in order to satisfy his parents’ right to due process.  Unlike in camera testimony of children called into a judge’s chambers to express their custodial preference under seal, this case featured the open-court testimony of a son against his own Mother.

Next, the Court of Appeals, in Roguska v Roguska, examined whether a family court could reject a settlement agreement on custody reached at court-ordered mediation by both parties and their respective attorneys.  In that case, the Mother subsequently attested that her husband lied during mediation, that she and her husband had serious communication problems, and that she subsequently obtained a PPO against the husband.

The Roguska panel held that such facts freed the family court from having to follow the settlement agreement on the custody issue.  In cases of domestic violence, arbitration and mediation are allowed, but disfavored due to the coercion that can sometimes be brought to bear against the victim of abuse.

The case of Hoeve v Hoeve continues the series of Court of Appeals decisions holding that the parents' school-district decision may be, by itself, proper cause to change custody.  In Hoeve, the pre-school child spent week-on-week-off with mom and dad.  Father sought and was awarded sole physical custody, however, once the child became eligible for kindergarten.

The parents lived about 70-miles apart.  Father's motion to acquire sole physical custody succeeded at trial and was affirmed on appeal.

According to family law appellate attorney Scott Bassett, the Hoeve case suggests that parental school choice disputes is the "new frontier" in child custody litigation.

This is a summary of what came out of the Court of Appeals on matters of custody in 2009.  Many other decisions addressed the important issues of domicile and parenting time which will be addressed in future posts.

Only time will tell what 2010 will bring.

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